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Opinion

Education,ASUU And The Globalist Agenda (I)

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Professor Lukman Diso

 

L. I. Diso
BUK

When William Saint, the World Bank Education Consultant, came to Bayero University, Kano in 1999/2000, he hadn’t had the slightest idea that ASUU was ready for him. He was shocked by the level of mobilization and the ambush set to give him the terrifying welcome. The naive mindset people on such missions usually have about Africans being complacent, or having short memory and lacking a sense of history, was clearly visible in his mien. The apparent sudden realization that, contrary to his expectation, ASUU seemed to know the agenda they had been implementing in the last three decades (1970s, 1980s & 1990s), was, perhaps, what terrified him the more.

Let us take a short trip through these decades to see the picture that provides the logical context to this discussion. We shall return to Mr Saint to see who he was, what his mission in Nigeria was, how he planned to accomplish the mission, his encounter with ASUU at Bayero University, Kano, and part of his report recommendations to the World Bank.

All these may help to unravel the critical questions of why education has been systematically accorded diminishing national priority, and its role in Nigeria’s national development been consistently receding in the last 60 years. They would also help to deepen our insights into the trajectory that has shaped ASUU’s evolution and its struggles through the decades. Arising from all this may be the temptation to raise and tackle the following questions:
– Why has ASUU, of all the education stakeholders, decided to be the only consistent defender of education in Nigeria?
– Why do different Nigerian governments invariably respond to education crisis in the same pattern?
– What are the implications of government’s brazen hostility to education and the intermittent disruptions that follow as a consequence?
– What lessons could be learnt from ASUU’s consistent struggles for decades?

ASUU Strike And Posterity-Ameer Abdul Aziz

The 1960s, the decade of Nigeria’s independence, was afflicted with crippling political crisis, so turbulent that the new nation was shaken to its very roots. Whether it was an inevitable corollary of colonial vestiges that characterized such emerging nations, education, especially university education, seemed to remain relatively insulated, and as robust as it was anywhere in the world. The university teaching and learning environment, infrastructure and facilities were of high standard and comparably as good as anywhere in Europe and North America. Conditions of service were equally good and attractive. Staffing policy, in terms of staff-students ratio and staff mix, was based on best-practice standards, which produced a cosmopolitan environment and a vibrant academic culture necessary for university to thrive.
Therefore, the need for coming together as a body to represent the academics was not felt until 1965 when the Association for University Teachers (AUT) was formed. AUT was not political. It was formed to cater only for the welfare of the academics. Other variables that define university seemed to have been taken for granted.

However, in the decade of prosperity and consolidation, as the 1970s were referred to, Nigerian Universities began to slide gradually, at the beginning, as the military consolidated their firm grips on the country. Suddenly, though consciously, as if jinxed to a morgaged future, Nigeria decided to embrace a policy that marked the beginning of the cascading crisis that has bedevilled education, particularly university education, to this day, and likely, to a distant future. AUT protested to the extent of a strike to press for the Government to address the deteriorating conditions of education – teaching and learning, and welfare of staff and students.

However, the Gowon Military Government responded ruthlessly and crushed the strike. That experience served as an eye opener for the academics, and they moved to change the dynamics.

Despite the relative obscurity of the policy’s source and contents, it triggered a warning from concerned visionary and farsighted Nigerian citizens, scholars and the ASUU, which was formed in 1978 from the National Association of University Teachers (NAUT). They warned that the policy was clearly meant to serve the master and to rule over the target with all ruthlessness, to forcefully impose its contents, and ultimately emasculate the university system and education in general. However, as the decade was largely characterized by military culture, and the government, itself remotely manipulated by the same forces that had designed the policy, the warning was ignored. This explains why Obasanjo Military Regime witnessed a lot of crises in the education sector.

The NPN civilian government under Shagari (1979-1983) was a bit cautious towards university education, although there were largely unsuccessful attempts to violate university autonomy in order to implement the same surreptitious agenda. ASUU’s spirited resistance thwarted the implementation of the agenda. As the dogged struggle deepened, the first agreement that gave the academic staff the USS scale with 20% differential relative to civil service scale, was signed in 1982.

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The deepening contradictions in the Shagari Civilian administration provided the excuse that brought Buhari/Idiagbon military regime (Dec.1983- Aug. 1985) in a bloodless coup D’tat. Immediately they settled the military authoritarian culture began to manifest: the repressive policy mills were hastily deployed to launch a direct assault on the University and draconian decrees arbitrarily manufactured. Under this regime, the University was subjected to a torrent of attacks including:
– Termination of university cafetaria services
– Withdrawal of subsidies on accommodation in universities
– Workers retrenchment and wage freeze
– Transfer of university senate’s powers to NUC through Decree 16 of 1985
– Workers retrenchment and wage freeze
ASUU never relented in its strong resistence to these authoritarian policies despite all the harrassment and intimidation the union faced as a consequence.
The palace coup that toppled Buhari and brought Ibrahim Bodamasi Babangida (IBB) regime (1985 – 1993) was a continuation of the military and their repressive anti-intellectual culture. IBB regime never pretended that it was there to serve interests other than Nigerians’. Shortly after settling, the regime dropped the bombshell, unveiling a World Bank/IMF-packaged economic policy with fanatical determination to implement. While the regime initiated a national debate as to whether or not to take the IMF loan, it contemptuously ignored the process and silently took the loan with all the conditionalities before the public final verdict (a clearly overwhelming rejection). Nigerians were shocked by the regime’s stunning insensitivity in this reckless disregard for the far reaching and devastating socio-economic and political implications of this action.
ASUU became the intellectual light, in the forefront leading the resistance movement, providing an incisive critique of the regime’s economic policy and presenting simplefied but thorough analysis of the policy’s implications. The duo of ASUU and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), the former being an affiliate of the latter, became the most consistent and vocal critics of the policy, vigorously mobilizing the nation with the dogged insistence, to force the government to reverse its decision. As the government intentensified the commitment to the ruthless implementation of this anti-people economic policy, ASUU, NLC, NANS and other pro-people organizations turned the situation into a season of revolutionary activities: intellectually scathing public lectures and production of mobilizational publications to galvanize public opinion against government’s submission to the oppressive policy.
Sensing the massive public support and reaction and the obvious likely consequences, the IBB Regime bared its fangs, unleashing all the repressive instruments at their disposal. Barely one year into IBB’s tenure, the Regime started the full implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as a package of the IMF conditionalities. NLC, ASUU and NANS started to organize mass protest. NANS, using the Commemoration Day of “Ali-Must- GO”, staged a mass protest, in which many students were shot and killed in ABU, Zaria. The Government’s crackdown was widened and started in full swing:
– Arbitrary arrest of NLC leaders and “bombardment” of NLC offices started across Nigeria
– Plans to Weaken ASUU were hastily hatched and implemented
(1) ASUU was de-affiliated from the NLC by Decree 16 of 1986
(2) Payment of check off dues was made voluntary for ASUU and NANS
(3)The Abisoye Panel set up on ABU Crisis recommended sacking of lecturers for “…not teaching what they were paid to teach”
– A Year later (1987) UniBen VC, Prof. Grace Alele Williams, acting on the contrived report of visitation panel, announced the sack of ASUU President, Dr.Festus Iyayi, from the University. (ASUU Leadership Training Manual 2017).
By the time Dr Attahiru M Jega (Dr Iyayi’s Vice-President) was elected ASUU President in an early NDC in 1988, the IBB regime, following the World Bank Agenda, had added more to the list of its atrocities. In fact, a reign of terror was unleashed:
– Government’s plans to retrench lecturers and rationalize courses had already reached advanced stages
– Dr. Patrick Wilmot (ABU, Zaria), a Scholar and vocal critic of Western imperialism, and Ms. Firinne N.C. Adelugba (BUK) had been covertly abducted and deported from Nigeria
– Government was blatant in its refusal to implement the earlier negotiated EUSS (Elongated University Salary Structure)
– As fuel prices were hiked by the Regime, students protested and the Government responded with massive crackdown on their leadership and on other activists across the country
– NLC was summarily dissolved and sole administrator appointed. (ASUU Leadership Training Manual 2017)
These constituted Dr Jega’s immediate challenges as the new ASUU President, and his EXCO set out to confront them head on. They formed Joint Action Committee (JAC) with the Senior Staff Association of University Teaching Hospital, Research Institutes and Allied Institutions (SSAUTHRIAI) to present a united front. JAC submitted its demands to Government, which were expectedly shunned. Joint strike commenced nationwide on July 1, 1988. Curiously, only ASUU was immediately banned. The leadership of SSAUTHRIAI immediately capitulated, dissociated itself from the JAC and called off the strike. ASUU continued with the strike under University Lecturers’ Association (ULA). Government immediately launched a crackdown on national and local leadership of ASUU. Drs Jega, Iyayi, and other national officers were arrested and taken to unknown location (which was later learnt to be Lagos) for over a month. Many branch chairmen, secretaries and activists of the Union were arrested across the nation. Yet, the declared strike was kept alive by, more or less, leaderless members; it lingered for sometime, but finally fizzled out unofficially.
Signature campaigns for the release of all the arrested ASUU leaders and members were initiated nationwide. A legal action was instituted in Kano High Court for their freedom. A day to the verdict, Dr Jega was produced and presented to the court; and all others were released. Case closed, but ASUU remained officially banned (1988-1990). Despite this situation, academics never ceased to organize. They continued to network and organize under different names. It was remarkable, given the circumstances, to be able to stop the World Bank University Sector Loan Facility and consequential staff rationalization. The Loan Facility was carefully packaged to sow the seed for Nigerian University System Innovation Project (NUSIP), which popped up later as Obasanjo Administration’s initiative.
The occurrance of an interesting coincidence in 1990 helped to expose the desperation of the IBB regime to implement the IMF/World Bank policies. A day after the Association of University Teachers (AUT) – name adopted by the banned ASUU – had held a National Conference on the World Bank in OAU, Ile-Ife, the Orka Coup took place, April 22, 1990. In his coup speech, Major Gideon Orkar made apparently innocuous reference to the prevalent repressive tendencies of IBB and his Government. He adduced three reasons for the coup, part of which included:
“(d) The intent to cow the students by the promulgation of the draconian Decree Number 47.
(e) The cowing of the university teaching and non-teaching staff by an intended massive purge, using the 150 million dollar loan as the necessitating factor.”
Given the contemporary issues against which the ASUU, NLC and students were consistently united, and that which informed the core of their struggles against the government, it was easy for a sensitive government like IBB’s to perceive a connection between the coup and the conference. Hence, the conferene organizers, Prof. Omotoye Olorode and Dr. Idowu Awopetu (ASUU National Treasurer) were immediately arrested and detained as alledged coup suspects.They were subjected to military trials (Court Martial) but were found innocent and released. Yet, they were compulsorily retired “in public interest”. They were reinstated by the court when Prof. Aliu Babatunde Fafunwa became Education Minister.
After a long spell of unease between the Government and AUT (the former still defiant to address ASUU’s demands), September 1990 became a new dawn for ASUU as it was deproscribed. ASUU intensified its demand for collective bargaining – to negotiate the conditions of service and other work-related issues for its members. The IBB Gvernment remained adamant and invariably hostile whenever ASUU made attempt to push its demands, until May 1992, when Dr Jega was reelected President. After several failed efforts to get the Government to start negotiation, ASUU commenced the suspended strike. However, as if that was the Greenhouse conditions desperately needed, the Government readily submitted to start negotiation as the strike subsisted. What an irony! No sooner had the negotiation commenced than it was unilaterally suspended by the Government! ASUU had no option than to commence the strike.
On May 25, the strike commenced, but had to be suspended on May 30 as Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) stepped in. That marked the beginning of a series of crowded activities as ASUU responded to every Government move to arm-twist its way. ASUU continued to checkmate the Government’s unsavory litiny of absurdities until one by one they reached their climax and crumbled with a bang. Follow the labyrinth of tragicomedy of industrial relations as it unfolded:
– On June 1, the IAP found Dr Jega guilty of contempt of court, but the judge, apparently considering the weighty political implications, decided to waive it.
– On July 20, with Government irresponsibilty, ASUU had to commence the strike
– On July 22, ASUU was banned again, but the strike continued under Academic Staff of Nigerian Universities (ASNU)
– The situation remained until the Government was forced to negotiate through a committee it constituted
– On September 3, 1992, the two parties reached an agreement on Funding, Conditions of Service [with University Academic Salary Scale (UASS)], and Autonomy and Academic Freedom
– On September 4, the 4-month old strike was suspended and academic activities commenced.
Immediately the Agreement was signed, other university workers were instigated to ask for “parity”, insisting that whatever was given to ASUU must be given to them. Even some of their members reasoned and questioned the basis of their leaders’ claims to parity, pointing out that they had been part of JAC when the struggle had begun, but unilaterally decided to ditch the JAC, capitulated and called off the strike when the chips were down. With our union preserved and intact, and without any collectively bargained agreement, what justification do we have to claim parity? – these SSANU members rationally queried.
However, as implementation of the ASUU Agreement commenced SSANU intensified its parity demand, which led to another round of the “Theatre of the Absurd”. The new vicious cycle started with the appointment of Professor Ben Nwabueze as Secretary (Minister) of Education. He contrived a new concept of “the Agreement of Imperfect Obligation”, meaning that the FG/ASUU Agreement was not (legally) binding on the Government to implement. He therefore directed universities to stop implementing the UASS/USS. Without any provocation, Prof Nwabueze continued his vicious attacks on ASUU with systematic breaches of the Agreement. It was obvious that he was deployed to do the hatchet job, and he was certainly doing it with utmost efficiency. ASUU’s voice of protest was drowned in a wirlwind of blackmail and intimidation. Its persistent demand to stop the breaches of the Agreement came up against a brick wall. With most aspects of the Agreement rolled back and no sign of de-escalating the breaches, ASUU had no option other than to take action.
– ASUU resumed the strike on May 3, 1993, and all member universities joined
– Three days later, the Government announced the dismissal of all striking lecturers and salary stoppage
– A Decree making teaching essential service, retroactively prohibiting teachers from going on strike, was enacted
– All lecturers on strike were given sack letters
– In some campuses, lecturers were ejected from their houses, despite the argument that residency of campus quarters was governed by the rental law.
– A particular case of UniAbuja Vice-Chancellor, Prof. Isa Muhammed, was pathetic. He went to the extent of sending the estate staff to tear off the roofs of lecturers’ houses, and then the security personnel to eject them.
– Even after the reinstatement of all lecturers later, Prof. Isa Muhammed refused to reinstate the EXCO of UniAbuja.

(TO BE CONTINUED…..)

Opinion

El-Rufai/Uba Sani And Pantami’s Perceived Peace Of The Graveyard

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By Bala Ibrahim.

Yesterday was Sunday, a day recognized as the first day of the week, which in the Bible, holds supreme significance as the day of Jesus Christ’s resurrection. Some Christians call it the Lord’s Day. There are many interpretations given to show the significance of Sunday. But for the purpose of this article, attention would be given to the significance of yesterday’s Sunday, (29/03/2026), with special bias to the role it played in promoting reconciliation between parties and friends, as well as how, at the National Mosque, Abuja, the wall of religious divide was unconsciously demolished, as followers of different faiths scrambled over each other, in the competition for space to participate in the funeral rites of late Hajiya Umma El-Rufai, the deceased mother of Mallam Nasir El-Rufai.

By the Islamic tradition, when a Muslim dies, before he or she is taken to the grave yard, special prayers are offered on the deceased person’s body, at any convenient place, before proceeding to the cemetery. For late Hajiya Umma El-Rufai, the National Mosque Abuja, was the venue. And what happened there, is the prelude to this article.

If I say everyone that is anything in Nigeria was there, I think I am making an understatement. But that is not surprising, given the personal and political profile of the bereaved, who is Mallam Nasir El-Rufai. It may interest the reader to know that, among the early callers at the Mosque, were reputable Christians, with people like Peter Obi and Rotimi Amaechi, rubbing shoulders with Muslims, in the stampede to partake in the Islamic ceremonial practice. They know they don’t belong to the Islamic faith, but they want to share with Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, as an honour of solidarity, in the last rites given to his beloved mother. The duo of NSA Mallam Nuhu Ribadu and Governor Uba Sani were there face to face with El-Rufai. The atmosphere was solemn, sombre and clearly sorrowful.

Also present at the Mosque was Prof. Isa Ali Ibrahim Pantami, former Minister and renowned Islamic cleric, who seized the opportunity to advance the imperative of reconciliation in Islam. He started in the Mosque and continued at the graveyard, to the extent of persuading El-Rufai to shake hands with Uba Sani, with a soft but casual commitment from both sides, on the pleaded forgiveness. It was difficult, very difficult, especially when perused through the prism of Mallam Nasir El-Rufai’s position.

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Undoubtedly peace is fundamental to Islam, because it serves as a source of inner tranquillity and social harmony. The Quran has laid emphasis on reconciliation and kindness. So every Muslim is enjoined to embrace reconciliation. However, in advancing the course of reconciliation, timing is important, I think. We must not only perceive peace as merely the absence of conflict. No, it also has something to do with our state of mind. A man standing before the lifeless body of his beloved mother, at the graveyard, under intense pressure, is not in the appropriate state of mind to commit to any peace deal. Unless we are referring to the probabial peace of the graveyard.

The ambition of any reconciliation is to arrive at unity. And unity can only come after conflict, if there is healing. By definition, healing is the process of becoming healthy or whole again, encompassing the restoration of physical tissue, mental, or emotional well-being. A man under emotional pressure is not fit for commitment to any peace deal, I think. Unless we are referring to the probabial peace of the graveyard.

Peace of the graveyard is not genuine, because it could be deceptive, by resulting in forced calm, beneath which lies a deep tension. As a friend of the trio of El-Rufai, Nuhu Ribadu and Uba Sani, Sheik Pantami must go for a genuine, organic and sustainable peace agreement between the parties. More so, because they were genuine friends before.

All hands must be put on deck, to compel President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to come into the agreement. Because, he was the one who compelled Mallam Nasir El-Rufai to come into the Tinubu project in 2023. Indeed a lot of water had passed under the bridge. We should forget past misunderstandings or issues that are now irrelevant, and forgivable. Let’s move on from past disagreements and let go of grudges.That’s the only way to arrive at genuine reconciliation.

It may be recalled that the Muslim Rights Concern, MURIC, had long been appealing to the President, to come out clearly and reciprocate the gesture given to him in his time of need by Mallam Nasir El-Rufai. MURIC said they were the ones who persuaded El-Rufai to support Tinubu in 2023, as a result of which, he confronted the so called Buhari cabal, the then CBN Governor and other forces that were putting spanners in the work of the Tinubu project. The result of which is now President Tinubu. MURIC said El-Rufai does not deserve to be humiliated and went further to support their argument with the quote below:

“Noteworthy is a video clip showing how President Tinubu openly asked El-Rufai to join his government and this did not happen at a private meeting. It happened at a campaign ground, in the presence of thousands of party enthusiasts.”

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Opinion

Defection: Kwankwaso’s Legacy Under Scrutiny; A Critical Look at his Political Journey Since 1999

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Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso

 

When Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, the people of Kano embraced the moment with hope and expectation after years of military governance. Among the prominent figures who emerged at the time was Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, whose leadership inspired confidence among many citizens eager for progress and representation.

More than two decades later, however, Kwankwaso’s political legacy continues to generate debate, with supporters highlighting his achievements and critics questioning the long-term impact of his leadership on Kano’s development.

Kwankwaso’s first tenure as governor (1999–2003) was marked by visible infrastructure projects, including roads and public buildings, which were widely welcomed by residents. At a time when tangible government presence was limited, these developments symbolised a new beginning. Yet, some analysts argue that while these projects addressed immediate needs, they did not sufficiently tackle deeper structural challenges, particularly the decline of Kano’s once-thriving industrial economy.

Historically a major commercial hub, Kano’s economy had been weakening due to years of policy neglect and infrastructural decay. Critics maintain that a more comprehensive economic strategy might have helped revive industries and reduce dependence on federal allocations.

Kwankwaso’s defeat in 2003 by Malam Ibrahim Shekarau marked a turning point. Observers note that while the loss strengthened his political network and grassroots appeal, it also raised questions about the sustainability of the systems established during his administration. Many of the projects, though impactful, were seen as lacking the institutional depth needed for long-term continuity.

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Returning to office in 2011, Kwankwaso expanded his development agenda with increased infrastructure and an ambitious foreign scholarship programme that benefited thousands of Kano youths. The initiative is widely regarded as one of his most significant contributions, opening educational opportunities for many.

However, critics argue that despite these efforts, broader economic transformation remained limited. Rising population growth, unemployment, and declining industrial capacity continued to challenge the state’s development trajectory.

Beyond governance, Kwankwaso’s political influence has also shaped Kano’s power dynamics. His role in building a strong political movement—popularly known as the Kwankwasiyya—has been praised for mobilising grassroots support but criticised by some for reinforcing a personality-driven political structure.

Political analysts further point to the tensions surrounding the Kano Emirate as a significant episode in the state’s recent history. The controversial removal of Muhammadu Sanusi II highlighted deep divisions within the state’s political and traditional institutions, with varying opinions on the factors that led to the crisis.

In recent years, Kwankwaso’s shifting political alliances—from the PDP to the APC and later to the NNPP—have also drawn mixed reactions. While such moves are common in Nigeria’s political landscape, critics argue that they have contributed to instability and uncertainty within Kano’s political structure.

The 2023 elections brought another dimension to the discourse, with the emergence of Abba Kabir Yusuf as governor under the NNPP platform. Subsequent political developments, including evolving relationships between state and federal actors, have further shaped public debate about governance priorities and political strategy.

Today, Kwankwaso remains one of Kano’s most influential political figures, with a legacy that reflects both notable achievements and enduring controversies. While many credit him with expanding access to education and improving infrastructure, others believe that the state’s long-term economic and institutional challenges require deeper reflection.

As Kano continues to navigate its future, the assessment of past leadership—including Kwankwaso’s role—remains central to ongoing conversations about development, governance, and political direction.

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Opinion

The Godfather Who Mistook Democracy for Personal Ownership

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Kano Map

 

Murtala Muhammad Rijiyar Zaki

Democracy is, at its most essential, an act of trust. Citizens go to the polls, cast their votes, and place in the hands of an elected individual the authority to govern on their behalf. That authority is borrowed, not given. It is conditional, not absolute. It belongs, in the final and irreducible sense, to the people who granted it, and it must be exercised in their interest, not in the interest of whoever helped engineer its acquisition. This elementary principle, the very foundation upon which every credible democracy in the world is constructed, is the principle that Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso has spent the better part of three decades systematically, deliberately, and quite unapologetically violating. His violation of it is not accidental. It is not the product of ignorance or misunderstanding. It is the logical expression of a political philosophy that has always placed personal ownership above democratic accountability, and godfather authority above the sovereign will of the people.
To understand the full weight of this charge, one must first understand what godfatherism actually means in the Nigerian political context, and why it is not merely an inconvenient feature of our democracy but a fundamental corruption of it. A political godfather, in the Nigerian tradition, is a figure who uses his resources, his organization, and his influence to install candidates in elective office, with the explicit or implicit understanding that those candidates, once elected, will govern not primarily in the interest of the electorate but in the interest of the godfather. The elected official becomes, in this arrangement, less a representative of the people and more a proxy for the man who put him there. The voters, in this model, are not principals whose mandate the elected official is obligated to honor. They are a mechanism, a crowd to be mobilized and demobilized at the godfather’s discretion, a necessary inconvenience in the process of acquiring and exercising power.
This is the model that has been perfected, refined, and deployed with extraordinary effectiveness across the entire arc of his political career. He did not invent godfatherism in Nigerian politics, and it would be unfair to suggest otherwise. But he has practiced it at a scale, with a sophistication, and with a degree of institutional embedding that sets him apart from the ordinary political patron. Kwankwasiyya is not simply a network of political supporters. It is a parallel governance structure, a shadow administration that has, for years, operated alongside whatever formal government happened to be in power in Kano, always with the understanding that the real decisions, the real appointments, the real directions of policy would be filtered through one man’s judgment and one man’s calculations.
The most instructive way to appreciate the depth of this ownership model is to examine what happened each time a political associate of Kwankwaso dared to exercise the kind of independent judgment that democracy not only permits but actively demands. The case of Governor Abdullahi Ganduje is the first and perhaps most telling exhibit. Ganduje was Kwankwaso’s deputy governor, his chosen running mate, and eventually his personally endorsed successor. He was, by every public indication, a Kwankwasiyya man to the core. When he won the governorship and proceeded to govern Kano as an elected official accountable to Kano’s people rather than as a Kwankwasiyya proxy accountable to its founder, the consequences were swift, bitter, and enormously damaging to Kano’s political stability. war enraged. The two men, former partners and political brothers, became bitter enemies whose conflict consumed years of Kano’s political energy, distorted the state’s governance, and created divisions whose effects are still visible in the state’s political landscape today.
Now, with a precision that suggests not merely repetition but pathology, the same drama is performing itself with Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf. Abba was Kwankwaso’s political son in the most complete sense of that phrase. He rose through the Kwankwasiyya structure, received the movement’s full organizational support in the 2023 governorship election, and arrived in office as the standard bearer of a movement that had just achieved its most significant electoral victory in years. By the Kwankwasiyya ownership model, Abba was supposed to govern as an instrument of the movement’s will, making appointments that the movement approved, pursuing policies that the movement sanctioned, and maintaining, above all, the fiction that the man in Government House in Kano was the governor while the man who really governed Kano lived elsewhere and wore a red cap.
Abba refused. And in refusing, he did something that deserves to be named clearly and celebrated without reservation: he honored the democratic mandate that the people of Kano had given him. The people of Kano did not vote for Kwankwasiyya’s agenda on the ballot paper they cast in 2023. They voted for Abba Kabir Yusuf. They did not elect a movement to govern them. They elected a man. And that man, exercising the authority that democratic election confers, made decisions that his judgment and his reading of Kano’s interests demanded, including the strategically essential decision to align his government with the federal administration in order to ensure that Kano’s development was not held hostage to one man’s unresolved political grievances.
Kwankwaso’s response to this exercise of democratic independence has been to cry betrayal, to mobilize his movement’s considerable media machinery against the government, and to position himself as a martyr of political ingratitude. But let us be precise about what he is actually saying when he uses the language of betrayal in this context. He is saying that an elected governor who makes decisions without his approval has broken faith with him. He is saying that the democratic mandate of millions of Kano voters is subordinate to his personal expectations. He is saying, with a candor that his language barely conceals, that he considers the governorship of Kano to be, in some meaningful sense, his property, and that its occupant’s primary obligation is not to the electorate but to the man who arranged for his installation. This is not a democratic position. It is the position of a feudal lord who has temporarily misplaced his deed of ownership and wants it returned.
The scholarship program, so frequently invoked as the centerpiece of Kwankwaso’s benevolence, must also be examined in this context of ownership and obligation. It is a program of genuine educational impact, and that impact must be acknowledged. But it was also, by the testimony of its own structure and its own cultural expectations, a mechanism for creating politically indebted citizens. Young men who received Kwankwaso’s scholarships understood, without being told explicitly, that their education came with a political price tag attached. They were expected to be Kwankwasiyya soldiers, to wear the red cap, to attend the rallies, to defend the movement on social media, and to vote, organize, and mobilize as the movement directed. The scholarship was real. The debt it created was equally real. And a democracy in which citizens are politically indebted to a patron for their education is not a functioning democracy. It is a patronage system wearing democracy’s clothing.
There is a further dimension to this ownership model that deserves careful attention, and that is its impact on the quality of governance that Kano has received across the years of Kwankwasiyya’s dominance. When a governor knows that his political survival depends not on satisfying his electorate but on satisfying his godfather, his incentives are fundamentally distorted. He makes appointments that the godfather approves rather than appointments that competence recommends. He pursues policies that maintain the movement’s patronage networks rather than policies that address the state’s developmental needs. He manages information to protect the movement’s image rather than managing resources to improve the people’s lives. The distortion is systematic, and its costs, while difficult to quantify in any single instance, accumulate across years of governance into a development deficit of enormous proportions. Kano’s persistent structural challenges, its unemployment crisis, its struggling industrial base, its dependence on federal allocations, these are not merely the products of bad luck or difficult circumstances. They are, in significant part, the products of a governance model that has been answerable to the wrong principal for far too long.
It is worth pausing here to consider what genuine political mentorship, as opposed to godfatherism, actually looks like. A true political mentor invests in the development of younger leaders because he believes that stronger leaders produce better governance for the people he loves. He gives his mentees the tools, the networks, and the confidence to govern independently and excellently. He celebrates their independence as evidence that his investment has matured. He measures his own legacy not by how many proxies he controls but by how many excellent leaders he has released into public service. By every one of these measures, Kwankwaso’s relationship with his political sons fails the test comprehensively. He has not produced independent leaders. He has produced dependents, and when they outgrow their dependence, he has declared war on them. The pattern is too consistent, too repetitive, and too damaging to be explained as personal disappointment. It is the structural consequence of a political philosophy that was always about ownership rather than mentorship.
The people of Kano have a right, a democratic and a moral right, to a government that is accountable to them and only to them. They have a right to a governor whose first, last, and only political obligation is to the mandate they granted him at the ballot box. They have a right to a political culture in which their votes are the ultimate source of political authority, not a preliminary ceremony that a godfather subsequently ratifies or overrides according to his own judgment. Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf’s refusal to govern as Kwankwaso’s proxy is not a betrayal of democracy. It is democracy’s vindication. It is the system working precisely as its architects intended, returning authority to the people by insisting that their elected representative answers to them and not to the man who helped elect him.
Kwankwaso has spent decades building a movement and decades mistaking that movement for a mandate. He has confused organizational power with democratic legitimacy, confusing the ability to mobilize crowds with the right to govern through proxies, confusing the gratitude of scholarship beneficiaries with the sovereign consent of an electorate. These are not small confusions. They are the fundamental errors of a man who has been at the center of Nigerian democracy long enough to know better, and who has chosen, repeatedly and consequentially, not to.
Nigeria’s democracy is young, imperfect, and perpetually under pressure from precisely the forces that Kwankwaso represents: the forces that would reduce elections to expensive ceremonies legitimizing predetermined outcomes, that would convert public office into private property, and that would transform the people’s sovereign authority into a godfather’s personal asset. Every time a governor like Abba Kabir Yusuf insists on governing for his people rather than for his patron, he pushes back against those forces. Every time Kwankwaso responds to that insistence with outrage and accusations of betrayal, he reveals, with an honesty that his political communications never intend, exactly what he believed he owned and exactly why he was always wrong to believe it.
Kano does not belong to Kwankwaso. It never did. And the sooner his political calculations are made to reckon with that elementary democratic truth, the sooner the state can complete the transition from a political culture of patronage and ownership to one of accountability and genuine service. That transition is already underway. Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf, by the simple act of governing for the people who elected him, has done more to advance it than any political speech or manifesto could have achieved. That is not betrayal. That is, at long last, democracy beginning to mean what it was always supposed to mean in Kano.

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