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Actors, Likely Alliances And Winner Of Nigeria’s Presidential Election

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3 years ago

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Major Presidential candidates Atiku,Obi, Kwankwaso and Tinubu

 

By Hamisu Hadejia

Voters in Africa’s biggest democracy, Nigeria, prepare to go the polls February 2023. They will elect governors, state and federal legislators and the president to lead the biggest African economy when the tenure of the incumbent president Muhammadu Buhari ends on May 29, 2023. Mr Buhari of the All-Progressives Congress (APC) came to power on a wave of populist support with the triple promises to fix Nigeria’s economy, address insecurity and ‘kill corruption before corruption kills Nigeria’. The extent of the success or failure of president Buhari and the ruling APC in fulfilling these promises remain for Nigerians to assess. However, on November 17, the federal government of Nigeria through its statistics bureau (the National Bureau of Statistics) reported that 63% of Nigerians (133 million people) are multidimensionally poor. According to the CIA factbook, Nigeria has a total population size of 225,082,083 million people as of 2022, and most of it consist of young men and women between the age bracket of 18 to 40 years.

Since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, the high rate of poverty in the oil-rich West African country especially in the rural areas had forced many voters to barter their votes for monetary and or material rewards from power-hungry politicians. However, two recent developments could significantly curb electoral malpractices related to vote buying and results manipulation. First is the insistence by Prof. Mahmood Yakubu, the chairman of Nigeria’s electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), to deploy the Bimodal Voter Accreditation (BVA) system and to transmit ‘elections results to the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) in real-time on election day’. On this issue, the INEC chair is backed by section 50 sub-section 2 of the Electoral Act, 2022 which states that ‘voting at an election and transmission of results under this Act shall be in accordance with the procedure determined by the Commission.’ If this is done, election rigging which usually manifests in manipulation of results at the local and state collation centres could be greatly curtailed, if not eliminated. Also, the rampant use of ‘incident forms’ by manipulative politicians to transform registered ghost voters into accredited ones will be significantly minimized by the adoption of the BVA system. Secondly, the decision in October by Nigeria’s apex bank (the CBN) to redesign and replace the country’s top three-naira notes (N200, N500 and N1000) within a three-month window (until January 21, 2023) is seen by many analysts as targeting political moneybags. The CBN though maintains that its currency redesign policy was to mop up the excess unbanked N2.7 trillion (85%) of money in circulation out of the total supply of N3.23 trillion. Whether or not and the extent to which currency redesign policy, introduction of the BVA system and new provisions in the electoral act 2022 will help engender free and fair elections remains to be confirmed in the forthcoming 2023 polls.

However, president Buhari’s vow to bequeath a legacy of free and fair elections in 2023 may be a promise Nigerians can hang onto if the president’s apparent neutral posture during his party’s primaries meant his absence of personal stakes in the next elections. The presidential election is of particular interest to Nigerians and to the international community. Of the 18 presidential contenders, four appear to be the most prominent, namely: former Lagos state governor Bola Ahmed Tinubu of the ruling APC, former vice president Atiku Abubakar of the PDP, former Anambra state governor Peter Obi of the Labour Party (LP) and former Kano state governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso of the New Nigeria People’s Party (NNPP). What are the strengths and weaknesses of these presidential contenders? Who is likely to carry the day?

To address these questions, I should begin with the caveat that Nigeria’s 2023 presidential election scheduled for February 25th has never been this complicated for the political bookmakers to forecast. There is no doubt that two major political parties—the ruling APC and opposition PDP—still remain the dominant parties. However, the emergence and increasing popularity of such third-party candidates as Peter Obi and Rabiu Kwankwaso has made the presidential contests unprecedentedly unpredictable. This is even acknowledged by no less a stakeholder than the electoral body, INEC, which stated on November 18 through its commissioner, Mr Festus Okoye, that it prepares for possible presidential run-off. This position is obviously underpinned by certain new dynamics on the political scene in Nigeria.

Since first republic’s Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe, no Igbo politician—perhaps not even the Biafra secessionist commander-turned-politician Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu and his All-Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA)—has succeeded in uniting the hitherto politically passive and rudderless mainly Christian south-eastern Igbo voters under one political umbrella (the Labour Party). Thus, effectively, each of Nigeria’s three major ethnic groups—Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo— now has a formidable presidential candidate in Atiku, Tinubu and Obi, respectively. Historically, region (or ethnic group) and religion have exerted huge influence on politics and voting patterns in Nigeria. Against the backdrop of these and other factors which will be highlighted as we go along in our analysis, how could one rate the chances of these four prominent presidential contenders?

A Yoruba, Muslim and former governor of Lagos, Tinubu hails from the south-western zone which accounts for the second highest number of registered voters (18.3 million out of the total 96.3 million i.e., 19%) in the country. As a candidate of the ruling APC, Tinubu should enjoy the incumbency advantage. However, the circumstances of his winning the party’s primaries—without the overt support of the incumbent president whom he had earlier publicly lampooned in the build up to the primaries when he allegedly got wind of him not being the preferred presidency choice—meant that the incumbency factor may not yet be assured for Asiwaju. Also, the choice of a Muslim vice-presidential candidate in former Borno state governor Kashim Shettima, has pitted Tinubu against the Christians Association of Nigeria (CAN)—the umbrella body for Nigerian Christians which, justifiably or not, feels threatened by the APC’s same faith ticket. Tinubu’s choice of a northern Muslim (rather than a northern Christian) candidate as running mate can hardly be faulted on tactical ground; for although a choice of a northern Christian vice would have indeed balanced the APC ticket on both the regional and religious fault lines, that choice would have alienated the majority of voters in three predominantly Muslim northern geopolitical zones—NW, NE and NC (see figure 1)—which collectively account for 53.1% of total registered Nigerian voters. However, although sentiment of religion—as opposed to that of region (or ethnic group)— is the main thing that makes the average northern Muslim voter tick, it is highly unlikely if APC/Tinubu’s same-faith ticket will confer any extra electoral advantage on Tinubu for two reasons. First, the mood currently in the Muslim-dominated north is that of deep and widespread resentment with the ruling APC and, surprisingly, with Buhari himself who was, before coming to power, almost deified in the region. This dramatic change is attributed to worsening multi-dimensional poverty and pervasive insecurity which seem to have now thrown the average northern (and of course Nigerian) voter in to such a despondency and disillusionment that they have now effectively surrendered the choice of the next president to God—since they, without deferring to His omniscience, voted for Buhari and the result was not as expected or, for many, even catastrophic. Secondly, the PDP’s candidate, Atiku, is also Muslim, which means that both candidates cannot weaponize what Lewis (2007) rightly identifies as the most potent instrument for collective action in the Muslim north—i.e. religion. However, the apparently neutral impact of Tinubu’s same-faith ticket on the majority Muslim northern voters contrasts sharply with the protest it elicited from CAN and other prominent Christian figures and followers.

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But Tinubu is a politician with vast “political logistics” (a euphemism for money required to win elections in Nigeria) and astute organizational capabilities. He also appears to have understood the rudiments of patron-clientelist politics that typifies Nigeria. At the inauguration of his campaign in Jos, Tinubu was able to assemble all 20 APC governors, ministers, and president Buhari to flag off his campaign. He also has significant political capital to make from the rebellion of a group of five (G5) PDP governors who have, since the end of PDP primaries, appeared unwilling to support the candidate of their own party—Atiku. Moreover, northern APC governors’ open support to Tinubu before, during, and after the APC primaries will, if sincere, see them deploy institutional and monetary ‘resources’ to help Asiwaju sweep substantial amounts of the bloc northern votes. I use the conditional ‘if sincere’ to underscore the growing unease among influential northern elites/powerbrokers and electorates with the treatment Atiku is subjected to at the hands of the G-5—a group made up of all Christian governors and all (but one) southern governors. It remains to be seen whether the rebellion of G-5 governors would be an un-disguised blessing for Tinubu or one in disguise for Atiku—if the seeming G-5’s attempt to play the regional/religious cards triggers an equal and opposite reaction up north. For now, two major uncertainties face the APC presidential candidate Bola Tinubu: One, uncertainty about the commitment of the presidency and northern governors/elites whose apparent stakes in Tinubu’s candidacy appear to be limited to the fear of post-tenure probe—something they can risk negotiating with Atiku on if the current general disenchantment with APC lingers on and INEC insists on the use of BVA system which will severely curtail governors’ influence to swing their states to their favourite presidential candidate as they used to. Two, uncertainty about the real electoral consequences of the Christian community’s protests against his Muslim-Muslim ticket. Based on weight to 6 variables (political logistics, home advantage, away (dis)advantage, party popularity, ticket sensitivity, and internal/external networks)—which I codenamed Phaptien Presidential Election Predictor (PPEP)— Tinubu/APC has 35.0% probability of winning the next presidential election.

A Hausa/Fulani, Muslim, and former Nigeria’s vice president, Atiku hails from Adamawa state in the north-east— a zone which has the second least number of registered voters (12.8 million or 13.3%). Atiku’s major strengths are built on five pillars. First, the northern region he comes from has substantial electoral strength with a combined total of 53.1% of registered voters—and should it go down to the wire, he’ll be the clear favourite to sweep most of these votes . Secondly, his party’s balanced (Muslim-Christian) ticket has attracted no opposition from the Christian community. Thirdly, Atiku is also a man of enormous ‘political logistics’ and experience in political mobilization having contested for the presidency on five previous occasions. Fourthly, although without de jure incumbency advantage, Atiku looks set to gain from the lukewarm attitude of some APC politicians, ministers and other interests not favourably disposed to the Tinubu candidacy. For instance, in an interview in October, the current Minister of Labour and Employment, Mr Chris Ngige, refused to show open commitment to the presidential candidate of the ruling party. The body language of almost all current federal ministers betrays this palpable nonchalance to Tinubu’s candidacy. Fifthly, connecting some critical dots together, Atiku appears to enjoy the support of one of the two powerful camps of former military officers/rulers i.e., the camp of former General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) consisting of such influential retired Generals as T.Y Danjuma and Aliyu Gusau. The other one-man camp of former General/President Olusegun Obasanjo appears to be somewhat neutral—that is, if we gloss over the surprisingly very warm reception Obasanjo recently accorded the APC candidate Tinubu with whom he has had bitter political bones to pick.

However, the major challenge for Atiku now is the rebellion of the G-5 governors led by Mr Nyesom Wike—the Governor of Nigeria’s oil-rich Rivers state, which also has the fourth highest number of registered voters in the country. The extent to which G-5 rebellion will affect the chances of Atiku in the presidential election will substantially depend on whether or not INEC deploys the BVA system, which, as argued above, will significantly curtail the influence of governors to swing their states as they desire. Also, the open belligerence of G-5 members to Atiku appears to be having the unintended effects of slowly but surely shifting the sympathy of northern elites and electorates in Atiku’s favour. Just the same way the persistently vehement opposition to APC’s Muslim-Muslim ticket by some prominent northern Christians (such as the former SGF Babachir Lawal and former HoR speaker Yakubu Dogara) is beginning to shift the sympathy of sections of voters in the north towards the APC candidate. Based on PPEP, Atiku currently has 37.5% probability of wining the presidential election.

An Igbo and Christian, former governor of Anambra state, Mr Peter Gregory Obi, comes from the south-eastern zone which has the least number of registered voters (11.5 million or 11.9%). However, Obi’s strength comes from his passionate youthful supporters (nicknamed Obidients) who appear to be in the majority among the registered voters in the south-eastern and south-southern zones. Being the only prominent Christian candidate, Obi also appears to enjoy the sympathy of some voters from this community across the zones. Like the PDP, Labour Party’s Obi’s ticket is also balanced with his vice-presidential candidate, Datti Baba-Ahmad, being a northern Muslim—although an insignificant figure politically. However, in terms of ‘political logistics’, it is doubtful if Obi or his Labour Party has the potentials to ‘mobilize’ voters on a national scale. I can, on a first thought, project Obi to, hands down, win the majority of votes in the south-east and south-south and, possibly, secure the 25% minimum votes in Lagos and, probably, a few other states—that is, if current opposition against Tinubu’s same-faith ticket is of any real electoral significance. However, I can wager my bottom dollar that Obi cannot garner the minimum required 25% votes in 24 states and a simple majority in the first round just like it is also quite unclear who can actually pull that feat between Tinubu and Atiku. Now who, between Atiku and Tinubu, stands to gain or lose from the Obi phenomenon? I think the fact that the bulk of Obi’s supporters were hitherto traditionally pro-PDP and could have otherwise been supporting the PDP/Atiku would plausibly mean that Atiku has lost one of his strongholds. However, Atiku’s loss is obviously no gain for APC here. In fact, if the presidential polls go down to the wire and a re-run is required as widely speculated, alliances between Obi and Atiku look more likely than between Obi and Tinubu—for albeit sharing the same region (south) and, to a large extent, religion (Christianity), the Igbos and Yorubas do not see eye to eye politically. The two major southern ethno-linguistic groups still struggle with solving the Olsonian collective action problem, unlike the predominantly Muslim north (see Lewis, 2007). This highlights the ambiguity of Obi’s impact on the candidates of the two major parties (APC and PDP). Based on PPEP, Obi has 17.5% probability of winning the presidential elections in February.

Former Kano state Governor and Minister of Defence, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso is also a Hausa/Fulani Muslim contesting on the platform of the NNPP. Kwankwaso’s main strength derives from his influence in Kano—a state with the highest number of voters in the north (over 6 million). Kwankwaso’s populist policies have earned him the support of voters among the peasantry in many northern states. However, Kwankwaso’s political reach outside the north is limited mainly to communities of northern migrant workers resident in a coterie of affluent southern states. Like Obi, Kwankwaso is also of limited ‘political logistics’ and looks set to be to Atiku what Obi is to Tinubu. Falling out with the PDP and its top brasses including Atiku, Kwankwaso broke away to form his NNPP apparently on a personal mission to assert his influence or play the spoiler role for PDP/Atiku as some allege. If the presidential election goes down to the wire, it is more likely for Kwankwaso to ally with Tinubu than with Atiku—especially if Kwankwaso is able to weather the storm of multi-faceted pressure currently directed at him by some northern elites/powerbrokers to drop his ambition. Based on PPEP, Kwankwaso 10.0% probability of winning.

To sum up, it is obvious that the emergence of two increasingly popular third-party candidates in Peter Obi and Rabiu Kwankwaso have, to an extent, altered what would traditionally have been a two-horse race between two major Nigeria’s political parties—the APC (Tinubu) and PDP (Atiku). However, when the evidence are considered, none of the two third-party candidates has the real potentials to win the presidential contest—although they now look set to, unprecedentedly, have a significant, even indispensable, role to play in who eventually wins the ticket. Other important factors/variables that can influence the outcome of the presidential election pertain to recent amendments in the electoral act especially regarding the use of the Bi-modal Voter Accreditation (BMA) system, and electronic transmission of results from the polling units to the collection centre in real time. Also, depending on dynamics related to the actions, inactions and utterances of political actors, we can expect alignment and re-alignment of forces in both predictable and unpredictable directions going forward. But, in the final analysis, and for now—because time is of the essence in politics—the odds seem to slightly favour the PDP presidential candidate—Atiku Abubakar.

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Political Organization : Why Gov Abba Should Adjust

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15 hours ago

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February 17, 2026

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By Abba Anwar

It was evidently clear that, yesterday’s grand political gathering to formally welcome the Governor of Kano State, Abba Kabir Yusuf, into the fold of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), that took place at Sani Abacha Indoor Stadium, as was blessed by His Excellency, the Vice President Kashim Shettima, GCON, was a yardstick to measure, who is more prepared for 2027, between the Governor and APC stalwarts in the state.

With the first look of the historic gathering, one could understand that, most of those who handled the responsibility of organizing supporters from the side of the Governor, are either reluctant, weak or inexperienced.

I expected to see the movement of red caps all over. As the trademark of the Governor and his people. Which literally means, Governor and his people, who just joined APC, are firmly on ground. But the direct opposite was the case. What filled the air were T-shirts and Face Caps of APC juggernauts all over. Right from the Airport surrounding, to the streets where Vice President and other top guys passed, on their way to the stadium.

I want believe that, Governor Yusuf knows exactly where he came from and is very conversant with what his former political godfather, is capable of doing. If to say the event to receive the Governor, was singlehandedly left in the hands of the Governor and his team, ALONE, it wouldn’t be that successful.

This tells us the unwavering capacity of APC heavyweights at the event. Wherever you look, what you would see was supporters chanting slogans of their political directions. And more than 80 percent of those supporters, came from the APC big hands.

Many people started asking questions, as to where were the local government Chairmen? What of the Commissioners and Advisers of the Governor? Where were closest individuals to the Governor? What of Governor’s well wishers and enthusiasts?

It appeared like there was no good mobilisation from the part of the local government Chairmen. Who by design, commission or omission, are the ones who should play most of the role in organizing grassroot supporters from their respective local governments.

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Allah Ya jikan Murtala Sule Garo, ba dan ya mutum ba. Though he is alive, May Allah forgive Garo and bless him. When he was Kano State Chairman of the Association for Local Governments of Nigeria (ALGON) or when he was the Commissioner for Local Governments and Chieftaincy Affairs or when he was the State Organizing Secretary of the then ruling party, the atmosphere was brighter, cleaner and more promising.

The grand gathering speaks volumes about the capacity of four to five strong men I spotted in pre, during and post event period. All of them, adherent of APC. What I mean by that? I mean those APC people, Governor Yusuf met in the party, in the current political development.

These are His Excellency, the Deputy Senate President, Barau I Jibrin, CON, His Excellency former Deputy Gubernatorial candidate for APC, in 2023 election, Murtala Sule Garo, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, Hon Abubakar Kabir Bichi, Director General, National Productivity Centre, Hon Baffa Babba Dan Agundi and House of Representatives Member representing Tudunwada/Doguwa federal constituency, Hon Alhassan Ado Doguwa.

These people I mentioned, did their best at the event, to portray to Nigeria, Nigerians and the remnants from where Governor Yusuf left, that, APC is still alive and vibrant in Kano. And a clear message was sent to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, GCFR, that, the former Governor of the state, Abdullahi Umar Ganduje, CFR, does not relent. I only mentioned what happened principally and there are more to my observation from other people. Genuine and pretenders.

The role played by the five heavyweights I mentioned above, says a lot about who and who Governor Yusuf needs to work with in closer terms and relationship. All of them did their possible best, showcased political strategy, sophistication and engage the Governor in what can be termed as, the time to do it, is now. Either to make or mar. So the victory and its processes are largely in the hand of the Governor. When I say victory, I’m looking at 2027, largely.

Coming down the ladder, where I met Barau, Garo, Abba Bichi, Doguwa and Dan Agundi, the former chairman of Municipal local government, Hon Fa’izu Alfindiki and the current Commissioner for Information, Hon Abdullahi Waiya, did the needful. They did well in their own way. I salute the courage, commitment and unwavering loyalty being displayed. In pre, during and post event period. I eavesdropped their good work as good team players.

Down the ladder also, I saw the commitment, unwavering loyalty and support of Comrade Magaji Kabiru Gulu, from Rimingado and that boy Aminu Dahiru from Gwale local government. When it comes to organization, I’m sure they performed differently also.

I suggest, His Excellency, Yusuf, should cross examine most of his local governments’ bosses. It was crystal clear that their organization was very poor, inexperienced, shallow, loosely engaging and panic – laddened. While the Governor should sit-up and face the challenges head-on, working closely with APC hands is absolutely necessary.

Anwar writes from Kano
Tuesday, 17th February, 2026

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How Tinubu Betrayed the Muslim North: A Diagnosis of Promises, Power, and Political Backstabbing

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2 weeks ago

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January 31, 2026

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By Mohammed Bello Doka

We have been hearing funny questions in recent months, asked with a mix of sarcasm and denial: How exactly did Bola Tinubu betray the Muslim North? This article is a response to that question. Not emotion. Not sentiment. Not hatred. This is politics, reduced to its bare essentials: numbers, choices, consequences, and survival. If accusations are anything to go by, they are not inventions; they are reactions to observable facts. And facts, once assembled honestly, do not care about comfort.

The 2023 presidential election marked a deliberate rupture with Nigeria’s post-1999 conventions. Bola Tinubu chose a Muslim–Muslim ticket, fully aware of its implications. This was not accidental, nor was it imposed on him. It was defended vigorously across the North as a necessary sacrifice in the national interest. Muslim voters in the North were told, directly and indirectly, that competence mattered more than sentiment, that religion should not divide them, and that the ticket was a strategic gamble that would pay off in influence, inclusion, and protection. The Muslim North accepted this argument and delivered.

The numbers are not disputed. According to INEC’s final, state-by-state results, the North-West and North-East—Nigeria’s core Muslim-majority zones—produced close to ten million valid votes in the 2023 election. In Kano alone, a Muslim-majority stronghold, Tinubu secured over 517,000 votes, while Peter Obi managed barely 28,000. In Jigawa, Tinubu polled more than 421,000 votes; Obi did not reach 2,000. Katsina gave Tinubu about 482,000 votes to Obi’s roughly 6,000. Kebbi delivered nearly 250,000 votes for Tinubu; Zamfara close to 300,000. In Yobe and Borno, Tinubu again outpolled Obi by margins so wide they require no embellishment. When votes from Muslim-leaning North-Central states such as Niger, Nasarawa, Kwara, and Kogi are added, Tinubu’s support base in Muslim northern communities rises to between 3.8 and 4.9 million votes. That bloc alone formed a decisive pillar of his national victory.

Now compare this with what happened in Northern Christian-majority areas. In Plateau State, Peter Obi polled about 466,000 votes, while Tinubu secured roughly 307,000. In Benue, Obi’s 308,000 votes nearly matched Tinubu’s 310,000, despite Benue never having been a Labour Party stronghold. In the Federal Capital Territory, a demographically mixed but largely Christian-leaning territory, Obi recorded 281,717 votes against Tinubu’s 90,902—more than a three-to-one margin. In southern Taraba, voting patterns followed the same logic. These are not anecdotes; they are consistent results pointing to a clear pattern: Muslim northern communities voted overwhelmingly for Tinubu, while Christian northern communities aligned electorally with Christian-majority southern zones.

This pattern did not emerge by accident. For decades, Northern politics subsumed religious differences under a broader regional consensus. Christians and Muslims in the North often voted together, driven by shared interests in federal power, security, and economic leverage. In 2023, that consensus fractured. Christian-majority areas of the North no longer voted as part of a Northern bloc; they voted as part of a national Christian alignment. That fracture did not begin at the grassroots. It followed elite political decisions that elevated religious identity from a background factor into a central organising principle of national power.

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Having delivered the votes, the Muslim North expected returns. In politics, expectations are not moral demands; they are transactional realities. What followed instead was a growing sense of exclusion. Vice-President Kashim Shettima, presented as proof of northern inclusion, has exercised no visible institutional power commensurate with the region’s contribution. Unlike Atiku Abubakar, who as vice-president chaired the National Economic Council and drove privatisation policy, or Yemi Osinbajo, who chaired key reform committees and acted as president multiple times, Shettima has no defining portfolio. He does not control economic policy. He does not lead the national security architecture. He does not arbitrate party power. His presence is symbolic, not structural.

Appointments have reinforced this perception. Power in Abuja is not measured by the number of northerners in government; it is measured by where decision-making authority sits. Since May 2023, strategic economic and fiscal power has been perceived—rightly or wrongly, but persistently—to be concentrated within a narrow circle outside the Muslim North’s political reach. In Nigerian politics, sustained perception becomes reality. Regions do not rebel because they are ignored once; they react because they feel ignored consistently.

Insecurity has deepened this sense of betrayal. According to data from ACLED and corroborated by local security analysts, the North-West remains the epicentre of banditry and mass kidnapping. Thousands have been killed or displaced since Tinubu assumed office. Farmlands across Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, and Niger states remain unsafe, directly threatening food security. Yet there has been no decisive break from past security failures. No doctrine shift. No overwhelming show of force that signals a new era. Instead, communities are left to negotiate survival, often informally, while the federal response remains incremental and cautious.

The handling of negotiations with armed groups has compounded the anger. Several northern states continue to engage bandits through intermediaries, amnesty offers, or ransom-mediated releases. These practices predate Tinubu, but the absence of a clear federal prohibition or framework under his administration has consequences. In security studies, this creates moral hazard. Violence becomes a bargaining tool. The blunt question many northerners ask is unavoidable: what incentive does a young man have to farm or trade when picking up a gun attracts dialogue, attention, and concessions?

Supporters of the president often dismiss northern grievances as religious intolerance. That argument collapses under scrutiny. The same logic used to explain Obi’s landslide in the South-East and his strong showing in Lagos—identity mobilisation—explains voting behaviour in Northern Christian zones. Lagos itself exposes the hypocrisy. Tinubu lost Lagos, his political base, where he polled 572,606 votes against Obi’s 582,454. Ethnicity did not save him there. Identity politics did. If identity voting is a valid explanation in Lagos, it cannot be dismissed as hatred when the North responds politically to perceived exclusion.

Underlying these grievances is history. Nigeria’s constitution speaks of democratic choice, but Nigeria’s politics practises managed succession. Obasanjo’s role in installing Yar’Adua in 2007 is undisputed. The consolidation of APC power ahead of 2023 advantaged Tinubu decisively. Against this backdrop, fears in the North that incumbency could again be used to shape future political outcomes are not paranoia; they are historical inference.

This is why rumours of fragmentation or political marginalisation resonate so deeply in the North. The region is landlocked, security-fragile, and economically interconnected. Any national rupture—formal or informal—would hurt the North first and hardest. When trust erodes between a region and the centre, fear fills the vacuum. Silence from power does not reassure; it amplifies suspicion.

Beyond Islam and Christianity lies a more fundamental issue: survival as a political force. Divide the North internally, weaken its bargaining unity, and its influence diminishes without a single dramatic announcement. History shows that fragmented regions lose leverage quietly and permanently. Once cohesion is gone, recovery is generational.

This is not an emotional argument. It is a political diagnosis. Betrayal, in politics, describes unmet expectations after commitments are honoured. The Muslim North delivered votes in unprecedented numbers. It absorbed political risk. It defended an unconventional ticket. What it sees in return is limited influence, persistent insecurity, and a fracture in its internal cohesion.

The question, therefore, is no longer whether the accusation exists. It clearly does. The real question is whether it will be confronted honestly while there is still time to repair trust—or whether denial will harden grievance into something far more dangerous. Politics rewards foresight. It punishes complacency. The Muslim North is not asking for sympathy; it is demanding recognition of facts that are already on record.

Mohammed Bello Doka can be reached via bellodoka82@gmail.com

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The Game Changer: Abba Kabir Yusuf and the Politics of Reunion

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3 weeks ago

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January 30, 2026

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By: Muhammad Garba

In every political season, there emerges a figure whose actions rise above personal pride and partisan noise, a figure who understands that power is not merely about holding office but about healing fractures. In Kano today, that figure is Abba Kabir Yusuf. His return to the All Progressives Congress is not a retreat, nor is it a surrender. It is an act of political wisdom. In the language of the streets and the conscience of the people, it is the Game Changer, the unifier of divided paths.

Politics in Kano has never been a gentle affair. It is deeply emotional, fiercely ideological, and rooted in history. Over the years, loyalties hardened, camps solidified, and disagreements took on a life of their own. In such an atmosphere, it takes uncommon courage to choose reunion over resentment. Abba Kabir Yusuf has chosen the harder path. He has chosen the path that prioritizes Kano over camps, the people over pride, and the future over old wounds.

His rejoining of the APC must therefore be understood beyond the narrow lens of party movement. It is a statement that Kano can no longer afford endless political hostility. It is a recognition that governance thrives not in isolation but in cooperation. It is a belief that leadership is at its finest when it brings people together, even those who once stood on opposite sides.

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For Kano and its people, this reunion is a blessing in clear and practical terms. Kano is a state of enormous human capital, commercial energy, and cultural influence. Yet, its full potential has often been limited by political divisions that weakened its bargaining power at the national level. A united Kano speaks louder. A reconciled leadership attracts attention, projects confidence, and commands respect. By returning to the APC, Abba Kabir Yusuf places Kano closer to the center of national decision making, where policies are shaped, resources are allocated, and futures are negotiated.

There is also a deeper moral lesson in this move. Leadership is not stubbornness. Strength is not the refusal to change course. True strength lies in knowing when to let go of bitterness for the sake of progress. In choosing reunion, Abba Kabir Yusuf reminds us that politics should be a means to improve lives, not a battlefield for endless grudges. He embodies the ancient wisdom that peace is not weakness, and compromise is not defeat.

As a unifier, his value lies not only in where he stands but in what he represents. He speaks to the ordinary Kano citizen who is tired of political tension and hungry for development. He speaks to traders who want stable policies, youths who seek opportunity, and elders who long for harmony. His return reassures them that leadership can still be guided by conscience and collective interest.

The APC too stands to gain from this reunion. A party grows stronger not by exclusion but by accommodation. By welcoming Abba Kabir Yusuf back, the party signals maturity and readiness to move forward as a broad platform that reflects Kano in all its diversity. It becomes a house large enough to contain different histories but united by a shared responsibility to govern.

In the final analysis, Raba gardama is not merely a nickname. It is a role. It is the calling of leaders who step into the storm and calm it, who choose bridges over walls. Abba Kabir Yusuf has stepped into that role at a critical moment in Kano’s political journey. His return to the APC is a reminder that the greatest victories in politics are not won at rallies or polls alone, but in the hearts of a people yearning for unity, stability, and a future they can believe in.

Kano, once again, has been given a chance to walk together. And history will remember those who chose reunion when division was easier.

Muhammad Garba, writes from Kano

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