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From Cementing Poverty To Oiling Its Wheels ?

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President Bola Ahmad Tinubu

Hamisu Hadejia,PhD

Endowed with vast deposits of limestones, ‘why would Nigeria be spending millions of dollars importing cement from abroad?’. This was the question that agitated the mind of Nigeria’s former president Olusegun Obasanjo (OBJ) in the early 2000s, leading to the former president summoning the major cement importer at the time, Mr Aliko Dangote, to brainstorm on sorting out the puzzle.

A policy seeking to incentivise cement importers to start local cement manufacture, known as the backward integration policy (BIP), was consequently introduced in 2002, following the private conversations between OBJ and Dangote.

As a sectoral industrial policy, the BIP made the grant of cement import licenses conditional on cement importers demonstrating concrete commitment to set up local cement producing factories. The strategy was to phase out, before completely banning, cement importation when local factories could produce enough to replace imports—a strategy known in economics as ‘import substitution policy’.

Among other incentives, the BIP ensured the sales of foreign exchange (dollars) to cement entrepreneurs especially Dangote at the official rate. For example, in a Reuters report, Dangote was said to have secured $161 million at the official exchange rate (of between 197 to 199 NGN per 1 USD) from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) between March and May 2016. If Dangote were to (and he could without any accountability) re-sell this $161 million foreign exchange award in the currency black market, he would have made a profit of $100 million (£68 million) without lifting a finger. Thus, effectively, what this means is that just in a couple of months, the Nigerian government had subsidized Dangote to the tune of $100 million US dollars with taxpayers’ money, under the guise of supporting ‘strategic’ businesses.

Not only that, VAT/custom duty waivers on imported cement making equipment, credit guarantees, and a cumulative tax holidays of seven years were granted to Dangote Cement Companies (DCC).

Government’s support to infant firms, industries or entrepreneurs is not a new phenomenon in nations’ industrialization processes. Economists such as Alexandre Hamilton (1757-1804), Friedrich List (1789-1846), and contemporary ones like Ha-Joon Chang and Eric Reinert, have documented evidence confirming that these kinds of supports or state-business relations were instrumental to the industrialization of almost all industrialized nations of Europe, North America, and East Asia. However, the state-business relations in Nigeria especially in the cement industry deserves some critical reflections and re-evaluations for social welfare considerations.

THE PROS OF THE BIP

Within a little over a decade, the BIP succeeded in replacing cement imports with local production in Nigeria leading to the complete ban on importation of cement in 2012. Hence, government officials and industry players have never failed to flaunt the BIP policy as a national feat all patriotic Nigerians should celebrate. The bases for this conclusion are three: One, the policy has made Nigeria self-sufficient in cement production; two, it has created jobs opportunities; three, it saves Nigeria foreign exchange which, at the peak of import in 2008, was $304 million. While these ‘successes’ have been belaboured time and again, Nigerians have been deliberately left in the dark as to the costs of these achievements, which include, but are not limited to, the disproportionately lavish state incentives to cement investors as adumbrated above.

THE CONS OF THE BIP

The ban on cement imports and the dominance of a single player in Dangote gave rise to a monopoly, now duopoly, in the cement industry. Latching on to the opportunity, Dangote has used every trick in the book to initially eliminate competition (e.g., the case of Clestus Ibeto), charge exorbitant prices, and pay the state less than its due in taxes. Any evidence for these claims? Yes, there are plenty! For a start, it is a fact that the Nigerian cement consumers now buy a 50kg bag of cement at almost $10 (official rate). This is outrageously higher than what obtains in other markets including in many African countries, to some of which Dangote merely exports the clinkers he processes in Nigeria using Nigeria’s limestones for final processing and sales in those countries at prices lower than he sells in Nigeria! In fact, compared to its price in Nigeria, a 50kg bag of cement costs lower in China ($2.96), Malaysia ($2.3), India ($3.84), Kenya ($5.56), Zambia ($6.45), Egypt ($2.88), South Africa ($5.88), and Ghana ($7.0).

Also, some evidence suggests that the Nigerian state does not get actual value for the lavish incentives it splashes on Dangote. In the DCC’s 2016 annual report (p.139) for example, the company’s own independent auditors have pointed out that the company’s directors had made an ‘assumption’ about the pioneer statuses of different lines of productions at Ibese and Obajana factories. Without this ‘assumption’, the auditors concluded that:
“..an additional tax charge of N64.4 billion (2015: N40.0 billion) would have been incurred by the company if this assumption was not made in determining the tax liability.”

So, while the Nigerian state has subsidised Dangote generously, such efforts do not appear to have yielded benefits for both the state (which is not paid what is due to her in taxes) and Nigerian cement consumers (who buy cement at over 300% price differentials compared to other consumers elsewhere).

Moreover, with the cement manufacturing process being highly mechanised, the much-vaunted jobs created by the transformation of the industry is, in the final analysis, not worth the costs incurred from subsidization and the expensive cement prices Nigerians pay. For instance, the entire cement industry currently employs only around 30,000 workers directly, and most of these workers are truck drivers. Hence, it does not make any economic sense for Nigeria to, in a bid to keep a few thousand Nigerians in employment, sacrifice national housing needs/infrastructural development by forcing millions of Nigerians to pay extortionary cement prices. Dangote and other players in the industry cannot of course claim credit for the indirect jobs in the downstream retail segment of the industry because such jobs have been there and would still remain regardless of whether cement in produced locally or imported.

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But how has Dangote managed to ‘cement’ his cake and eat it? The answer to this crucial question lies in understanding the nature of two domains of relations, that is: The Dangote-government relations as well as his public or civil society management relations.

Dangote-state relations took off in earnest towards the end of the OBJ first term, that is around the time the BIP was introduced. In his book, ‘The Accidental Public Servant’, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, explained that Dangote came close to the OBJ government after the former president had fallen out with his powerful vice and major Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) financier at the time, Atiku Abubakar. Consequently, according to El-Rufai, “Obasanjo had to resort to raising money from other sources and that was how Aliko Dangote came into prominence in the government.”

A document from the US embassy in Nigeria leaked by Wikileaks would later reveal that “Dangote purportedly contributed 200 million naira (about $1.5 million at the time) to Obasanjo’s first term election campaign, and in 2003 at least another 1 billion naira (about USD 7.5millio) for the second term. Dangote is a known contributor to the PDP party.” The cable therefore concluded that, ‘it is no coincidence that many products on Nigeria’s import ban lists are items in which Dangote has major interests.’ Former President Yar’Adua of blessed memory saw through this kind of Dangote’s much-vaunted ‘entrepreneurial acumen’ and moved to free poor Nigerian cement consumers from the monopolistic exploitation before the cold hands of death cut him short. Ever since, the business continues with successive regimes securely holding the cement cash cow by the horns for Africa’s ‘entrepreneurial guru’ to milk in exchange for God knows what.

It is instructive to point out here that across the globe, investment in the cement industry takes between 20-30 years to deliver returns. However, in Dangote’s case, returns were delivered in less than a decade. To be clear, no one should begrudge Dangote his fundamental economic right to capital accumulation, however, such private economic right should also not be enjoyed at the social cost of denying Nigerians their fundamental right to housing through extortionary pricing of a product that their own state subsidizes, disproportionate to the social benefits for that matter.

Also, across the globe, profit margins in cement companies range between 30-40%, yet, in Nigeria it is up to 63%! This is because a couple of Nigerians gifted with ‘entrepreneurial acumen’ have the wherewithal to ‘lobby’ state officials to protect the market for them to charge whatever price they fancy. In a paper, Richard Itaman and Christina Wolf calculated that between 1999 and 2010, when cement import was severely restricted before its eventual ban, the Nigerian cement consumers, on average, lost N19.63 billion (that is, around $51.4 million in 2021 USD/Naira value) per year because of buying cement at exorbitant prices compared to the rest of the world. In fact, during the same period, Richard and Christina observed that cement prices had progressively increased by up to 300%.

In addition to ‘lobbying’ the political leadership, Dangote, as investigations by Michael Odijie and Anthony Onofua reveal, ensures the extraction of massive rents in the industry without any opposition from any quarters through his patron-clientelist relations with, and alleged infiltration of, trade/labour union and public/civil society organizations. The authors observed that Dangote generously ‘donate’ to the activities of these civil society groups with a view to ‘promoting the [BIP] policy as a major success.’. The authors stated that he installed his allies in the leadership of critical trade organizations such as the Manufacturers’ Association of Nigeria (MAN). Incessant ‘donations’ and yearly ‘gifts’ to such organizations as the National Association of Block Moulders of Nigeria and Trade Union Congress have also been attributed to silencing the voices of comrades who were hitherto vehement campaigners against extortionary cement pricing. Michael and Anthony have also observed trends in the co-optation of the media to popularise the narrative that local cement manufacturing is a collective national ‘success’.

THE WAY FORWARD

The new administration of President Bola Tinubu will do well by moving in the interest of impoverished Nigerians to address this cement issue decisively. Nigeria should not continue to protect a couple of producers at the expense of millions of Nigerian cement consumers. According to former minister of finance, Mrs Zainab Ahmed, ‘the Federal Government will require about $100 billion annually for the next 30 years to effectively tackle Nigeria’s infrastructure challenges.’ Also, the United Nations remarked that “Nigeria’s housing sector is in a complete crisis”. Undoubtedly, a critical part of addressing these challenges/crises is by making cement prices affordable to Nigerians. How can this be done? In my view, since the cement producers have been protected and subsidized for longer and larger than necessary, it is time for the cement market to be completely liberalized to allow for imports. This will facilitate competition which will beat prices down and ease the excruciating economic hardship of Nigerians. This is elementary economics. Even if local manufacturers who have been mollycoddled for over a decade fail to compete, so be it! The social benefits of suspending the long imports ban far outweigh the largely private benefits of sustaining it. The benefits of promoting indigenous private capital accumulation or keeping less than 30,000 largely truck-drivers’ jobs are not worth making millions of Nigerians homeless in their own fatherland. So, President Tinubu has a choice to make between appeasing a couple of capitalists/cronyists or salvaging millions of poor Nigerians who have no roof over their heads.
Dangote’s refinery: Like cement, like oil?
In celebrating the construction/commissioning of “world’s largest single-train petroleum refinery” without asking some critical questions, we, Nigerians, appear to have given in more to our sentiment than to our rationality. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)’s governor, Mr Godwin Emefiele, who according to Dangote “moved mountains to ensure the success of [his refinery] project”, the apex bank ensured the availability of foreign exchange to Dangote to pay for equipment imported for his $19.5 billion refinery. What amounts of this scarce foreign exchange was sold to Dangote? What other monetary and fiscal incentives have been provided to the entrepreneur for the refinery project, and under what terms and conditions? Will all imports of refined oil and assorted products henceforth be banned for Dangote to enjoy another monopoly status in the oil industry, like he does in cement with all its concomitant consequences? Is the 20% Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)’s stakes in Dangote’s refinery a bait, decoy, or marriage of convenience to attract state patronage for profiteering business as usual?
Hamisu Hadejia (PhD)

Opinion

Amnesty International Report and My Questions to Them

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– Sufyan Lawal Kabo

sefjamil3@gmail.com

 

The recent condemnation issued by Amnesty International against the Kano State Government over the alleged killing of five persons during activities surrounding the swearing in of the new Deputy Governor has continued to raise serious concerns among many observers in Kano.

 

While every responsible citizen condemns violence and the loss of innocent lives, many are asking whether Amnesty International acted professionally and fairly before rushing to issue a strong public accusation against the government of Kano State.

 

Amnesty International, can a government that has invested heavily in ending political thuggery and street violence genuinely be accused of sponsoring the same violence it is fighting to eliminate?

 

Would a government that established the Safe Corridor Kano Model, profiled thousands of repentant youths, and committed over six hundred million naira for rehabilitation, empowerment and reintegration of former thugs suddenly turn around to encourage killings and chaos?

 

Can Amnesty International deny the fact that Kano has battled political thuggery and Yan Daba violence for decades, long before the present administration came into office? And among previous administrations, which government confronted the problem more directly than the administration of Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf?

 

What political benefit would any serious government gain from encouraging violence against citizens at a time it is working to secure public trust ahead of future elections?

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Before issuing its condemnation, did Amnesty International contact the Kano State Government, the Police, DSS, Civil Defence, or any recognised security agency in Kano to verify the allegation properly? Or has social media content now become sufficient evidence for an international organisation claiming credibility and neutrality?

 

How did Amnesty International arrive at such a sensitive conclusion without presenting verifiable evidence to the public? And how sure are the people of Kano that those supplying information to the organisation are not politically biased individuals determined to damage the image of the present administration?

 

Is it professional for a respected international body to release emotionally charged reports involving deaths and violence without balanced investigation, fair hearing, or proper engagement with relevant authorities?

 

Can Amnesty International also deny the visible security efforts of the Kano State Government under Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf, including stronger collaboration with security agencies, community security initiatives, deployment of operational support, and consistent public warnings against political violence and hooliganism?

 

If the government’s objective was violence, why would it continue investing public resources into youth rehabilitation, anti thuggery programmes and community peace initiatives?

 

The truth remains that Kano State Government has already condemned every act of violence connected to the incident and security agencies are reportedly investigating the matter. The government has also maintained its commitment to bringing perpetrators to justice according to law.

 

Amnesty International must therefore understand that careless or poorly verified reports on sensitive matters can create unnecessary tension, damage public confidence and unfairly malign governments making visible efforts to solve difficult social problems.

Kano deserves fairness. The people deserve peace. And organisations claiming international credibility must uphold professionalism, objectivity and thorough investigation before issuing reports capable of inflaming public emotions and damaging institutional reputations.

 

Sefjamil writes from Abuja

 

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Opinion

Evidence First: Why Amnesty International’s Kano Claims Cannot Stand-Mamman Iro

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By Mamman Iro Kano

May 7, 2026

On May 5, 2026, Kano State witnessed a moment of constitutional significance. Alhaji Murtala Sule Garo was formally sworn in as Deputy Governor, completing the executive structure of an administration that has navigated months of political turbulence with a clarity and a purposefulness that its governance record continues to validate. Within hours of that ceremony, Amnesty International released a report alleging that five people had been killed in connection with the event. The Kano State Government, in a formal press statement signed by the Commissioner for Information and Internal Affairs, Ibrahim Abdullahi Waiya, described the claim as misleading, unfounded, and mischievous, stating that active inquiries conducted with relevant security agencies produced no official report or credible evidence to support it, and that no violent incident occurred at the Kano State Government House or its surroundings during the official function. That irreconcilable gap between what Amnesty International alleged and what verified institutional assessments confirm is where this analysis begins, and where the evidence, examined honestly and without partisan filter, must ultimately speak for itself.

Let us be precise about what Amnesty International has alleged, because precision about the nature of an allegation determines the standard of evidence required to sustain it. This is not a vague claim about generalised insecurity in a northern Nigerian state. It is a specific allegation that five human beings were killed in direct connection with a formal state government ceremony, at or near the seat of the Kano State executive. That is among the most serious categories of claim available in the vocabulary of human rights reporting, and it carries a correspondingly heavy evidentiary burden. It attributes to a sitting administration not merely a failure to prevent violence but a direct and operational causal relationship between its own institutional activities and the deaths of five people. The fundamental question this analysis asks is straightforward: does the available evidence meet that burden? On the basis of the documented record, the answer is no.

The government’s rebuttal, issued through Commissioner Waiya on the same day as the Amnesty International report, establishes several institutionally grounded counter-claims that any responsible assessment must engage with seriously rather than dismiss as reflexive political defensiveness. The government states that it conducted active inquiries with relevant security agencies specifically to investigate the alleged incident and found no official report or credible evidence to support it. It states that no violent incident occurred at Government House or its surroundings during the swearing-in ceremony. It further notes that the Nigerian leadership of Amnesty International has, in its assessment, repeatedly demonstrated bias and unprofessional conduct in reports relating to Kano State while overlooking comparable developments elsewhere in the country, and it has called upon the organisation’s international leadership to monitor its Nigerian chapter’s activities in order to protect the organisation’s global integrity. These are specific, falsifiable, and institutionally grounded positions. They deserve the same investigative engagement that Amnesty International’s original allegations received, and the absence of independent forensic confirmation of the alleged deaths from any local security structure, community stakeholder, or civil society organisation with verifiable on-the-ground presence represents a critical and unresolved gap in the evidentiary foundation upon which the international narrative rests.

The methodological questions raised by this incident go beyond the specific facts of May 5, 2026, and engage with a broader and more consequential concern about how international human rights monitoring is conducted in environments as politically complex as Kano State. In today’s digital information environment, allegations circulate at velocities that far outpace the deliberate, forensically grounded verification processes that responsible documentation requires. Video content spreads without verified timestamps, geographic authentication, or editorial context. Short clips are selectively edited and repurposed, constructing plausible-seeming narratives from fragmentary and decontextualised evidence. Responsible human rights reporting, particularly in a state with Kano’s political and security complexity, must demonstrably rise above these limitations. Any attempt to directly implicate a state government in acts of organised violence must be supported by credible forensic evidence establishing verifiable operational linkages between institutional authority and the specific conduct alleged, verified intelligence assessments from recognised security structures, a documented understanding of the longstanding criminal rivalries and territorial disputes operating among youth groups in the affected communities, and independent on-the-ground verification involving community leaders, traditional authorities, and civil society organisations before conclusions are publicly disseminated. The Unifier Project’s considered assessment is that the claims advanced against Kano State on May 7, 2026, do not demonstrably meet these standards.

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Beyond the specific facts of May 5, the broader institutional record of the Kano State Government presents a body of documented evidence that fundamentally complicates the narrative of state-sponsored violence. The administration’s Safe Corridor Kano Model, its flagship rehabilitative intervention targeting youth restiveness and street violence, has already profiled over 2,030 repentant youths for enrollment into its structured rehabilitation and reintegration programme. More than six hundred million naira has been approved for the first phase alone, targeting one thousand beneficiaries through vocational training, psychosocial support, and community reintegration pathways. These are not aspirational policy commitments. They are quantified, budgeted, and operationally active institutional investments in dismantling the conditions that produce youth violence. The logical incompatibility between an administration that has committed over N600 million to youth rehabilitation and an administration simultaneously accused of orchestrating the killing of citizens at its own official functions is not a rhetorical flourish. It is a substantive evidentiary consideration that any responsible investigation is obligated to address directly and honestly before reaching the conclusions that Amnesty International has chosen to advance.

The full governance record of this administration further deepens that incompatibility. Kano State is implementing a N1.477 trillion budget for 2026, the largest in its history, with 68 percent directed at capital projects. It has invested over N800 million in youth empowerment programmes benefiting more than 5,300 young people, disbursed over N334 million directly to 6,680 women entrepreneurs across all 44 local government areas, and deployed 2,000 trained Neighbourhood Watch operatives as a community-centred security intervention designed to reduce violent confrontations at the grassroots level. Kano ranked first in Nigeria’s 2025 NECO results. Its hospitals are being upgraded. Its roads are being rebuilt. Its farmers are receiving fertiliser, its dams are being constructed, and its young people are being empowered with tools, capital, and opportunity. This is the operational context within which any characterisation of this administration’s relationship to the welfare and safety of its citizens must be situated. It is a context that demands engagement rather than dismissal from any monitoring body that claims to be conducting evidence-based human rights assessment.

There is a further dimension to this controversy that must be named clearly and without diplomatic evasion. The perception, held by a growing number of informed observers within Kano’s civic and political communities, that Amnesty International applies differential levels of scrutiny to Kano State relative to comparable or more severe situations elsewhere in Nigeria, is not a fringe complaint or a partisan deflection. It is a concern about the institutional evenhandedness that determines whether human rights advocacy functions as a genuine instrument of accountability or as a mechanism of selective narrative construction. When a state government with a documented N600 million rehabilitation investment, a quantified youth empowerment record, and a formal security agency finding of no evidence for the alleged incident is subjected to internationally amplified allegations of organised violence without the forensic verification that such allegations require, the credibility deficit that results belongs not only to the monitoring organisation but to the broader enterprise of international human rights advocacy whose authority depends on its perceived consistency and impartiality. This is a concern that the international leadership of Amnesty International, if it takes its institutional mission seriously, cannot afford to disregard.

The position advanced in this commentary is neither anti-accountability nor pro-impunity. It is, precisely and unambiguously, pro-evidence. Accountability without evidence is not accountability. It is accusation. And accusation, however institutionally prestigious its source, does not become fact through repetition, amplification, or the authority of the body advancing it. It becomes fact through verification, corroboration, and the honest and transparent application of the evidentiary standards that distinguish responsible human rights documentation from the uncritical transmission of unverified claims. Kano State, its government, its institutions, and its 20 million people deserve to be assessed on the basis of verified evidence rather than viral narratives. The international community deserves human rights reporting that it can trust because it has earned that trust through methodological rigour rather than claimed through institutional reputation. And the communities of Kano State, who live with the real and daily consequences of how their home is characterised to the world, deserve nothing less than the truth, told with the honesty, the precision, and the evidentiary integrity that their situation demands. Evidence must come first. It must always come first. And until it does, claims of the gravity advanced against Kano on May 7, 2026, cannot, in good conscience, be allowed to stand unchallenged.

 

 

 

Mamman Iro Kano wrote in from Gwarzo Road, Kano, Kano State.

May 7, 2026

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The Unifier Perspective: Unifier Project Formally Contests the Evidentiary Basis of Amnesty International’s Claims Regarding the May 5 Kano Incident

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Issued by the Unifier Project, Kano State

May 7, 2026

The Unifier Project, a strategic grassroots coordination and civic engagement initiative with operational structures across all 44 Local Government Areas of Kano State, has formally and comprehensively contested the evidentiary basis, the methodological framework, and the investigative rigour of the claims recently circulated by Amnesty International regarding the unfortunate events of May 5, 2026. In a statement issued from its State Secretariat in Kano, the organisation expressed serious concern about what it characterises as a pattern of premature conclusion-drawing that privileges the velocity of digital content circulation over the deliberate, community-engaged, and forensically grounded verification processes that responsible human rights documentation demands.

The Unifier Project wishes to state unequivocally that its position in this matter is not one of reflexive institutional defensiveness or partisan political alignment. It is a principled insistence on the application of the same evidentiary standards, the same contextual rigour, and the same methodological discipline that credible human rights advocacy demands of the governments and institutions it monitors. The organisation stands firmly for truth, due process, and the protection of community peace, and it is precisely those values that compel it to challenge characterisations of the May 5 incident that, in its assessment, rely disproportionately on fragmented viral content and speculative interpretive frameworks rather than verified, independently corroborated, and contextually grounded investigative evidence.

The incident of May 5, 2026, as assessed by local security institutions, community stakeholders, and civil society organisations with direct knowledge of the affected communities, involved individuals and groups with longstanding criminal histories, territorial disputes, and inter-factional rivalries whose origins significantly predate the current administration and whose dynamics are embedded in the specific social and geographic conditions of the communities in which they operate. The Unifier Project maintains that any credible and responsible investigation of events in these communities must engage substantively with this documented local context before advancing conclusions about political motivation, institutional complicity, or state-level orchestration. To assign political causation to events whose most proximate and most documented explanation is criminal confrontation, in the absence of forensic evidence establishing direct operational linkages between political decision-making and the conduct alleged, is to substitute analytical convenience for investigative integrity.

The organisation draws particular attention to the documented policy commitments of the Kano State Government as a body of institutional evidence that any serious investigative framework is obligated to engage with rather than treat as irrelevant background. The administration has pursued a structured, programmatically defined, and resource-backed approach to addressing youth restiveness and street violence through the Safe Corridor initiative, a rehabilitative framework explicitly designed to create pathways for the social reintegration, vocational empowerment, and psychosocial recovery of vulnerable young people previously associated with organised criminality and street violence. The internal coherence of any allegation of state-sponsored violence must be evaluated against the totality of a government’s documented institutional behaviour. An administration that has invested public resources, political capital, and programmatic infrastructure in a deescalation framework of this scope cannot credibly be implicated, without compelling forensic evidence, in the simultaneous engineering of the very instability that its own institutional architecture is demonstrably designed to eliminate.

The Unifier Project also draws attention to the broader governance context within which the events of May 5, 2026, must be situated. The Kano State Government is currently implementing its most ambitious development budget in the state’s recorded history, a N1.477 trillion appropriation for 2026 with 68 percent directed at capital expenditure spanning education, infrastructure, healthcare, and social protection. It has invested over N800 million in youth empowerment programmes benefiting more than 5,300 young people across the state, disbursed over N334 million directly to 6,680 women entrepreneurs across all 44 local government areas, and deployed 2,000 trained Neighbourhood Watch operatives as a community-centred security intervention explicitly designed to reduce violent confrontations and strengthen civilian-security cooperation at the grassroots level. These are not abstract policy commitments. They are documented, verifiable, and independently assessable institutional actions that constitute the operational context within which any characterisation of this administration’s relationship to violence and instability must be rigorously evaluated.

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With respect to the methodological concerns that this incident raises for the broader practice of international human rights monitoring, the Unifier Project wishes to articulate clearly the evidentiary standards that it considers non-negotiable for any responsible investigative conclusion regarding events of this nature. These include credible forensic evidence establishing verifiable operational linkages between institutional decision-making authority and the specific conduct alleged, verified intelligence assessments from recognised and accountable security structures with direct knowledge of the affected communities, a demonstrated and documented understanding of the longstanding rivalries, territorial histories, and criminal network dynamics operating among youth groups in the specific localities concerned, and independent on-the-ground verification processes that meaningfully engage traditional authorities, community leaders, civil society organisations, and relevant law enforcement institutions before conclusions are formed and publicly disseminated. Without these foundational standards, investigative outputs risk functioning not as instruments of accountability but as mechanisms of institutional narrative-building that may, whether intentionally or otherwise, distort rather than illuminate the complex realities they purport to document.

The organisation further notes that the long-term credibility and institutional authority of global human rights bodies depend critically on the perceived consistency, proportionality, and methodological evenhandedness of their monitoring activities across different regions, different administrations, and different categories of political actor. Investigative patterns that appear to apply differential evidentiary thresholds or differential levels of scrutiny to different communities generate, among those communities, a perception of selective activism that is difficult to distinguish from politically motivated monitoring, and that ultimately undermines the culture of civic accountability that responsible human rights organisations exist to strengthen rather than selectively deploy. The Unifier Project does not raise this concern to deflect legitimate scrutiny. It raises it because the integrity of international human rights advocacy as a global public good depends on its practitioners holding themselves to the same standards of evidence, consistency, and contextual honesty that they demand of others.

Kano State is a community in active, measurable, and documented transformation. Its urban renewal programmes, governance reforms, public sector modernisation initiatives, and community stabilisation efforts represent a sustained and verifiable commitment to building a safer, more inclusive, and more prosperous society for its more than 20 million residents. The Unifier Project, with its operational presence across all 44 Local Government Areas and its direct engagement with ward-level civic structures throughout the state, is positioned to affirm, from direct community knowledge, that this transformation is real, that it is generating tangible improvements in the daily lives of ordinary citizens, and that it deserves to be assessed on the basis of its documented outcomes rather than characterised through the lens of allegations that remain forensically unsubstantiated and contextually inadequate.

The Unifier Project reaffirms its commitment to civic accountability, community protection, and the defence of due process as foundational values of democratic governance. It respectfully but firmly urges Amnesty International to engage in a more collaborative, locally informed, and forensically rigorous investigative process, one that prioritises direct engagement with community stakeholders, traditional authorities, security institutions, and civil society actors with verifiable local knowledge, before issuing globally amplified conclusions whose reputational, political, and institutional consequences for the communities concerned are significant and lasting. Allegations of the gravity advanced in this instance should carry only one weight, the weight of independently verified, contextually grounded, and forensically corroborated evidence. The Unifier Project will continue to discharge its responsibility to the people of Kano State by ensuring that the state’s story is told with the accuracy, the balance, and the contextual integrity that its communities deserve.

About the Unifier Project: The Unifier Project is a strategic grassroots coordination and civic engagement initiative committed to community mobilisation, administrative transparency, civic participation, and the strengthening of socio-political unity across Kano State. With operational structures spanning all 44 Local Government Areas and active engagement at ward and polling unit levels throughout the state, the organisation serves as a community-anchored platform for informed civic advocacy, responsible public discourse, and the protection of Kano’s social and institutional integrity.

Signed:

Unifier Project, Kano State

Media and Strategic Communications Unit

May 7, 2026

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