Hamisu Hadejia,PhD
Endowed with vast deposits of limestones, ‘why would Nigeria be spending millions of dollars importing cement from abroad?’. This was the question that agitated the mind of Nigeria’s former president Olusegun Obasanjo (OBJ) in the early 2000s, leading to the former president summoning the major cement importer at the time, Mr Aliko Dangote, to brainstorm on sorting out the puzzle.
A policy seeking to incentivise cement importers to start local cement manufacture, known as the backward integration policy (BIP), was consequently introduced in 2002, following the private conversations between OBJ and Dangote.
As a sectoral industrial policy, the BIP made the grant of cement import licenses conditional on cement importers demonstrating concrete commitment to set up local cement producing factories. The strategy was to phase out, before completely banning, cement importation when local factories could produce enough to replace imports—a strategy known in economics as ‘import substitution policy’.
Among other incentives, the BIP ensured the sales of foreign exchange (dollars) to cement entrepreneurs especially Dangote at the official rate. For example, in a Reuters report, Dangote was said to have secured $161 million at the official exchange rate (of between 197 to 199 NGN per 1 USD) from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) between March and May 2016. If Dangote were to (and he could without any accountability) re-sell this $161 million foreign exchange award in the currency black market, he would have made a profit of $100 million (£68 million) without lifting a finger. Thus, effectively, what this means is that just in a couple of months, the Nigerian government had subsidized Dangote to the tune of $100 million US dollars with taxpayers’ money, under the guise of supporting ‘strategic’ businesses.
Not only that, VAT/custom duty waivers on imported cement making equipment, credit guarantees, and a cumulative tax holidays of seven years were granted to Dangote Cement Companies (DCC).
Government’s support to infant firms, industries or entrepreneurs is not a new phenomenon in nations’ industrialization processes. Economists such as Alexandre Hamilton (1757-1804), Friedrich List (1789-1846), and contemporary ones like Ha-Joon Chang and Eric Reinert, have documented evidence confirming that these kinds of supports or state-business relations were instrumental to the industrialization of almost all industrialized nations of Europe, North America, and East Asia. However, the state-business relations in Nigeria especially in the cement industry deserves some critical reflections and re-evaluations for social welfare considerations.
THE PROS OF THE BIP
Within a little over a decade, the BIP succeeded in replacing cement imports with local production in Nigeria leading to the complete ban on importation of cement in 2012. Hence, government officials and industry players have never failed to flaunt the BIP policy as a national feat all patriotic Nigerians should celebrate. The bases for this conclusion are three: One, the policy has made Nigeria self-sufficient in cement production; two, it has created jobs opportunities; three, it saves Nigeria foreign exchange which, at the peak of import in 2008, was $304 million. While these ‘successes’ have been belaboured time and again, Nigerians have been deliberately left in the dark as to the costs of these achievements, which include, but are not limited to, the disproportionately lavish state incentives to cement investors as adumbrated above.
THE CONS OF THE BIP
The ban on cement imports and the dominance of a single player in Dangote gave rise to a monopoly, now duopoly, in the cement industry. Latching on to the opportunity, Dangote has used every trick in the book to initially eliminate competition (e.g., the case of Clestus Ibeto), charge exorbitant prices, and pay the state less than its due in taxes. Any evidence for these claims? Yes, there are plenty! For a start, it is a fact that the Nigerian cement consumers now buy a 50kg bag of cement at almost $10 (official rate). This is outrageously higher than what obtains in other markets including in many African countries, to some of which Dangote merely exports the clinkers he processes in Nigeria using Nigeria’s limestones for final processing and sales in those countries at prices lower than he sells in Nigeria! In fact, compared to its price in Nigeria, a 50kg bag of cement costs lower in China ($2.96), Malaysia ($2.3), India ($3.84), Kenya ($5.56), Zambia ($6.45), Egypt ($2.88), South Africa ($5.88), and Ghana ($7.0).
Also, some evidence suggests that the Nigerian state does not get actual value for the lavish incentives it splashes on Dangote. In the DCC’s 2016 annual report (p.139) for example, the company’s own independent auditors have pointed out that the company’s directors had made an ‘assumption’ about the pioneer statuses of different lines of productions at Ibese and Obajana factories. Without this ‘assumption’, the auditors concluded that:
“..an additional tax charge of N64.4 billion (2015: N40.0 billion) would have been incurred by the company if this assumption was not made in determining the tax liability.”
So, while the Nigerian state has subsidised Dangote generously, such efforts do not appear to have yielded benefits for both the state (which is not paid what is due to her in taxes) and Nigerian cement consumers (who buy cement at over 300% price differentials compared to other consumers elsewhere).
Moreover, with the cement manufacturing process being highly mechanised, the much-vaunted jobs created by the transformation of the industry is, in the final analysis, not worth the costs incurred from subsidization and the expensive cement prices Nigerians pay. For instance, the entire cement industry currently employs only around 30,000 workers directly, and most of these workers are truck drivers. Hence, it does not make any economic sense for Nigeria to, in a bid to keep a few thousand Nigerians in employment, sacrifice national housing needs/infrastructural development by forcing millions of Nigerians to pay extortionary cement prices. Dangote and other players in the industry cannot of course claim credit for the indirect jobs in the downstream retail segment of the industry because such jobs have been there and would still remain regardless of whether cement in produced locally or imported.
But how has Dangote managed to ‘cement’ his cake and eat it? The answer to this crucial question lies in understanding the nature of two domains of relations, that is: The Dangote-government relations as well as his public or civil society management relations.
Dangote-state relations took off in earnest towards the end of the OBJ first term, that is around the time the BIP was introduced. In his book, ‘The Accidental Public Servant’, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, explained that Dangote came close to the OBJ government after the former president had fallen out with his powerful vice and major Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) financier at the time, Atiku Abubakar. Consequently, according to El-Rufai, “Obasanjo had to resort to raising money from other sources and that was how Aliko Dangote came into prominence in the government.”
A document from the US embassy in Nigeria leaked by Wikileaks would later reveal that “Dangote purportedly contributed 200 million naira (about $1.5 million at the time) to Obasanjo’s first term election campaign, and in 2003 at least another 1 billion naira (about USD 7.5millio) for the second term. Dangote is a known contributor to the PDP party.” The cable therefore concluded that, ‘it is no coincidence that many products on Nigeria’s import ban lists are items in which Dangote has major interests.’ Former President Yar’Adua of blessed memory saw through this kind of Dangote’s much-vaunted ‘entrepreneurial acumen’ and moved to free poor Nigerian cement consumers from the monopolistic exploitation before the cold hands of death cut him short. Ever since, the business continues with successive regimes securely holding the cement cash cow by the horns for Africa’s ‘entrepreneurial guru’ to milk in exchange for God knows what.
It is instructive to point out here that across the globe, investment in the cement industry takes between 20-30 years to deliver returns. However, in Dangote’s case, returns were delivered in less than a decade. To be clear, no one should begrudge Dangote his fundamental economic right to capital accumulation, however, such private economic right should also not be enjoyed at the social cost of denying Nigerians their fundamental right to housing through extortionary pricing of a product that their own state subsidizes, disproportionate to the social benefits for that matter.
Also, across the globe, profit margins in cement companies range between 30-40%, yet, in Nigeria it is up to 63%! This is because a couple of Nigerians gifted with ‘entrepreneurial acumen’ have the wherewithal to ‘lobby’ state officials to protect the market for them to charge whatever price they fancy. In a paper, Richard Itaman and Christina Wolf calculated that between 1999 and 2010, when cement import was severely restricted before its eventual ban, the Nigerian cement consumers, on average, lost N19.63 billion (that is, around $51.4 million in 2021 USD/Naira value) per year because of buying cement at exorbitant prices compared to the rest of the world. In fact, during the same period, Richard and Christina observed that cement prices had progressively increased by up to 300%.
In addition to ‘lobbying’ the political leadership, Dangote, as investigations by Michael Odijie and Anthony Onofua reveal, ensures the extraction of massive rents in the industry without any opposition from any quarters through his patron-clientelist relations with, and alleged infiltration of, trade/labour union and public/civil society organizations. The authors observed that Dangote generously ‘donate’ to the activities of these civil society groups with a view to ‘promoting the [BIP] policy as a major success.’. The authors stated that he installed his allies in the leadership of critical trade organizations such as the Manufacturers’ Association of Nigeria (MAN). Incessant ‘donations’ and yearly ‘gifts’ to such organizations as the National Association of Block Moulders of Nigeria and Trade Union Congress have also been attributed to silencing the voices of comrades who were hitherto vehement campaigners against extortionary cement pricing. Michael and Anthony have also observed trends in the co-optation of the media to popularise the narrative that local cement manufacturing is a collective national ‘success’.
THE WAY FORWARD
The new administration of President Bola Tinubu will do well by moving in the interest of impoverished Nigerians to address this cement issue decisively. Nigeria should not continue to protect a couple of producers at the expense of millions of Nigerian cement consumers. According to former minister of finance, Mrs Zainab Ahmed, ‘the Federal Government will require about $100 billion annually for the next 30 years to effectively tackle Nigeria’s infrastructure challenges.’ Also, the United Nations remarked that “Nigeria’s housing sector is in a complete crisis”. Undoubtedly, a critical part of addressing these challenges/crises is by making cement prices affordable to Nigerians. How can this be done? In my view, since the cement producers have been protected and subsidized for longer and larger than necessary, it is time for the cement market to be completely liberalized to allow for imports. This will facilitate competition which will beat prices down and ease the excruciating economic hardship of Nigerians. This is elementary economics. Even if local manufacturers who have been mollycoddled for over a decade fail to compete, so be it! The social benefits of suspending the long imports ban far outweigh the largely private benefits of sustaining it. The benefits of promoting indigenous private capital accumulation or keeping less than 30,000 largely truck-drivers’ jobs are not worth making millions of Nigerians homeless in their own fatherland. So, President Tinubu has a choice to make between appeasing a couple of capitalists/cronyists or salvaging millions of poor Nigerians who have no roof over their heads.
Dangote’s refinery: Like cement, like oil?
In celebrating the construction/commissioning of “world’s largest single-train petroleum refinery” without asking some critical questions, we, Nigerians, appear to have given in more to our sentiment than to our rationality. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)’s governor, Mr Godwin Emefiele, who according to Dangote “moved mountains to ensure the success of [his refinery] project”, the apex bank ensured the availability of foreign exchange to Dangote to pay for equipment imported for his $19.5 billion refinery. What amounts of this scarce foreign exchange was sold to Dangote? What other monetary and fiscal incentives have been provided to the entrepreneur for the refinery project, and under what terms and conditions? Will all imports of refined oil and assorted products henceforth be banned for Dangote to enjoy another monopoly status in the oil industry, like he does in cement with all its concomitant consequences? Is the 20% Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)’s stakes in Dangote’s refinery a bait, decoy, or marriage of convenience to attract state patronage for profiteering business as usual?
Hamisu Hadejia (PhD)
